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ABSTRACT 
The National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) estimates that between 1940 
and 1978 eleven million people were exposed to asbestos.
1
 Unfortunately, 
asbestos usage was prevalent long before its harmful effects were 
discovered. Taking anywhere from twenty to fifty years to develop, up to 
10% of people with prolonged exposure to asbestos contract mesothelioma.
2
 
Thought to be harmless, asbestos was often used as insulation in many 
buildings because of its fire resistant qualities. As a result, companies 
exposed their employees to asbestos on a daily basis for decades. Asbestos’ 
fibrous quality allows the mineral to embed itself in fabrics, including the 
fabrics of employees’ clothing. Workers exposed to asbestos, who went 
home with asbestos fibers embedded in their clothing, often accidently 
exposed their family members and others to asbestos. This take-home 
exposure to asbestos resulted in sickness and death for many people 
unaffiliated with the asbestos worker’s company. 
Family members exposed to secondhand asbestos often file negligence 
actions against their loved ones’ employers. In these cases, the family 
member plaintiffs, often dealing with a fatal illness and a mountain of 
hospital bills through no fault of their own, typically allege that the 
employer negligently managed the toxin. Conversely, defendants, facing a 
hefty lawsuit from a remote plaintiff, frequently argue that they owed no 
duty to the plaintiffs because these plaintiffs never worked for them.  
As the saying goes, hard cases make bad law. The tension between 
plaintiffs with large losses and defendants with only remote responsibility 
creates complicated cases, and as a result, inconsistent law. In determining 
whether an employer owes a duty to a non-employee whose exposure to 
asbestos occurred off premises, state courts have applied different tests, 
thereby achieving wildly different results in cases involving substantially 
similar fact patterns.  
This Note proposes a multi-factored test that emphasizes the importance 
of foreseeability in duty determinations. In the first section it discusses the 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. ASBESTOS.COM, https://www.asbestos.com/mesothelioma/statistics.php (last visited 
Jul. 27, 2017). 
 2. Id.  
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case precedent that illustrates the various approaches utilized by courts 
around the nation. The second section describes the solutions explored by 
secondary sources. In the last section, this Note advocates for a modified 
version of the Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co. test. Like the test in 
Satterfield, this modified test will emphasize the importance of 
foreseeability as a necessary first step in duty analysis. However, unlike the 
Satterfield test, this modified test will not consider whether the conduct 
constitutes misfeasance or nonfeasance as a factor in determining whether 
companies owe third-party plaintiffs a duty of care in take-home exposure 
cases. Finally, although courts are (in many jurisdictions) without statutory 
authority on the matter, this Note takes the position that legislative action 
can solve this problem much more efficiently than judicial action. The 
legislature should direct the courts to consider certain factors rather than 
allowing them to create their own judicial balancing test.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Numerous negligence claims involving take-home asbestos exposure 
were filed in the last twenty years.3 With some variation, most of these cases 
follow a general fact pattern: Company B employs A. In the course of 
employment, A is exposed to asbestos fibers. These fibers attach to A’s 
clothing, and he exposes family member C to the asbestos fibers somewhere 
outside the workplace. C develops mesothelioma and brings a suit to 
recover damages from Company B. Because mesothelioma is an “asbestos-
related cancer,”4 causation and damages are usually not the primary 
concern, leaving the duty determination as the sole disputed issue. 
Accordingly, Company B frequently argues that it owes no duty to family 
member C, a third-party plaintiff, who was exposed to the asbestos off-site. 
Despite similar fact patterns in most cases,5 courts have applied many 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 3. Sheila Doyle Kelley & Allison N. Fihma, United States: Recent Trends in Asbestos 
Litigation, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/203748/Personal+Injury/ 
Recent+Trends+in+Asbestos+Litigation (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).  
 4. ASBESTOS.COM, https://www.asbestos.com/mesothelioma/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2016). 
 5. See generally Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162 (Del. 2011); Miller 
v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex.)., 740 
N.W.2d 206, 209 (Mich. 2007); Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 
2010); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008).  
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different tests to determine duty, consequently reaching wildly different 
results.6 
A. Satterfield Gave Great Weight to Foreseeability Over Other Factors. 
In Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., twenty-four-year-old Amanda 
Satterfield died from mesothelioma.7 Her estate tried to recover damages 
from her father’s employer, Alcoa.8 In many of its operations, Alcoa used 
asbestos.9 In the 1930s, Alcoa became aware that asbestos is a highly 
dangerous substance and discovered that “the air in its factories contained 
high levels of asbestos fibers and that its employees were being exposed to 
these fibers on a daily basis.”10 Later, in the 1960s, Alcoa learned that the 
family members of its employees were at increased medical risk due to their 
regular exposure to asbestos on employee clothing.11 In 1972, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) released 
regulations that prohibited employees who had been exposed to asbestos 
from taking their work clothes home to be laundered.12 These regulations 
notified all American businesses of the harmful effects of asbestos exposure.  
Ms. Satterfield’s father, Doug Satterfield, worked at Alcoa after the 
OSHA regulations on asbestos were released.13 His assignments resulted in 
daily exposure to high levels of asbestos dust and fibers, but Alcoa did not 
educate Mr. Satterfield about the risks associated with handling asbestos.14 
During Mr. Satterfield’s time with Alcoa, Ms. Amanda Satterfield was born 
prematurely and spent the first three months of her life in the hospital.15 
Every day, Mr. Satterfield visited his daughter in “the hospital immediately 
after work [while] wearing his asbestos-contaminated work clothes.”16 
Accordingly, “from the day of her birth, Ms. Satterfield was exposed to the 
asbestos fibers on her father’s work clothes.”17 When Ms. Satterfield was 
                                                                                                                                      
 6. See generally Price, 26 A.3d at 162; Miller, 740 N.W.2d at 209; Boley, 929 N.E.2d at 
448; Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 347.  
 7. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 351. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 352. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at 352-53. 
 12. Id. at 353. 
 13. See Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 353.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  
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diagnosed with mesothelioma, she filed suit against Breeding Insulation 
Company (“Breeding”) and Alcoa.18 Following her unfortunate death at the 
young age of twenty-four, her father was substituted as plaintiff and 
voluntarily dismissed the claims against Breeding.19 Alcoa, however, argued 
that it owed no duty to its employee’s daughter.20 After the trial court 
dismissed the claim, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling.21  
In Satterfield, the issue was whether Alcoa owed a duty of reasonable care 
to Ms. Satterfield.22 To resolve this matter, the court first looked to the 
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance.23 The court, having 
determined that there was misfeasance in this case, heavily emphasized the 
importance of foreseeability in determining whether a defendant owed a 
duty to a plaintiff.24 Only if the injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable could 
the defendant owe a duty to the plaintiff.25 Then, after determining 
foreseeability, the Satterfield court sought to determine if there were any 
countervailing principles that prevented the defendant from owing a duty 
to the plaintiff.26 
The Satterfield court described two potential categories of negligence 
cases. In the first category, defendants “[have] engaged in an affirmative act 
that created an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to [the 
plaintiff].”27 For cases in this category, the court considers whether 
“countervailing legal principles or policy considerations warrant 
determining that [the defendant] nevertheless owed no duty [to the 
plaintiff].”28 In the second possible category of cases, defendants are 
negligent by omission.29 In these cases, the court looks to see whether there 
is “the sort of special relationship . . . that gives rise to a duty.”30 Because 
                                                                                                                                      
 18. Id.  
 19. See Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 354. 
 20. Id. at 352. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 355. 
 24. See id. at 364-65. 
 25. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 366.  
 26. Id. at 355.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 355. 
 30. Id.  
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duty is an essential element of all negligence claims,31 the Satterfield court 
reasoned that Ms. Satterfield’s claim would fail if Alcoa did not owe her a 
duty.32 
Generally, “persons have a duty . . . to refrain from engaging in 
affirmative acts that a reasonable person ‘should recognize as involving an 
unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another’ or acts 
‘which involve[ ] an unreasonable risk of harm to another.’”33 However, this 
general rule does not necessarily “require that persons always act reasonably 
to secure the safety of others.”34 Instead, the general rule against engaging in 
unreasonably risky affirmative acts “serve[s] a more limited role as 
restraints upon a person’s actions that create unreasonable and foreseeable 
risks of harm to others.”35 
Next, the Satterfield court elaborated on the distinction between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance. Misfeasance is “active misconduct working 
positive injury to others,” while nonfeasance constitutes “passive inaction,” 
such as “a failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or [failing] to 
protect them from harm not created by any wrongful act of the 
defendant.”36 However, it is possible for omissions to be categorized as 
misfeasance.37  
After explaining the general duty to refrain from unreasonably risky acts, 
the Satterfield court noted that the “no duty to act” rule is not without 
exception. In cases where certain special relationships exist between the 
defendant and either the source of the danger or the person who is 
foreseeably at risk from the danger, “[t]hese relationships create an 
affirmative duty either to control the person who is the source of the danger 
or to protect the person who is endangered.”38 
After explaining its own view of the law, the court then compared the 
precedent established by other state courts. Some courts have held that 
there can be no liability in the absence of a special relationship between the 
                                                                                                                                      
 31. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 355. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 284, 302, (1965) (alterations in 
original)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 355-56 (quoting Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of 
Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L.REV. 217, 219 (1908)). 
 37. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 357. 
 38. Id. at 359-60 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A, B; 315 (1965)). 
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plaintiff and the employer,39 while others have held that employers commit 
misfeasance by operating their factories in such a way as to create an 
unreasonable risk of harm of asbestos exposure to those who came into 
contact with its employees.40 The Satterfield court held that requiring a 
special relationship for there to be a duty would be misplaced under 
Tennessee tort law.41 The court explained that “[w]hether a case involves a 
simple automobile accident or a complicated toxic tort, Tennessee law 
currently provides that one owes a duty to refrain from engaging in conduct 
that creates an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to others.”42 
The Satterfield court further held that the case “involve[d] a risk created 
through misfeasance.”43 The court emphasized that “Alcoa was aware of the 
dangerous amounts of asbestos on its employees’ clothes,” yet “did not 
inform its employees that the materials that they were handling contained 
asbestos or of the risks posed by asbestos fibers to the employees or to 
others.”44 In addition, “Alcoa dissuaded its employees from using on-site 
bathhouse facilities, and it failed to provide coveralls or to wash its 
employees’ work clothes at the factory.”45 These facts constituted 
misfeasance. 
The duty inquiry did not end after determining whether there was 
misfeasance or nonfeasance.46 The Satterfield court next considered whether 
a duty existed, and if so, to what extent.47 In determining the existence and 
scope of duty, the court considered public policy because “the concept of 
duty is largely an expression of policy considerations.”48 Though public 
policy is important, the Satterfield court emphatically rejected any notion 
that “the concept of duty is a freefloating application of public policy.”49 The 
court reasoned that because “[i]n most cases today . . . the presence or 
absence of a duty is a given rather than a matter of reasoned debate, 
                                                                                                                                      
 39. See id. at 361 (citing Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from 
Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206, 222 (Mich. 2007)). 
 40. See id. at 362(citing Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579–7–I, 2007 WL 
2325214 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 363. 
 43. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 364. 
 44. Id. at 363.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. at 364. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 364-65 (quoting Burroughs v. McGee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tenn. 2003)). 
 49. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 365. 
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discussion, or contention,”50 courts should “turn to public policy for 
guidance” when “the existence of a particular duty is not a given or when 
the rules . . . are not readily applicable.”51  
After noting the role public policy plays in determining the existence and 
scope of one’s duty, the court listed eight factors that are useful for this 
public policy determination:  
(1) the foreseeable probability of the harm or injury occurring; 
(2) the possible magnitude of the potential harm or injury; (3) 
the importance or social value of the activity engaged in by the 
defendant; (4) the usefulness of the conduct to the defendant; (5) 
the feasibility of alternative conduct that is safer; (6) the relative 
costs and burdens associated with that safer conduct; (7) the 
relative usefulness of the safer conduct; and (8) the relative safety 
of alternative conduct.52  
Regarding foreseeability, the court analyzed Alcoa’s knowledge of 
asbestos. Given that Alcoa knew of asbestos’ many dangers and chose not to 
inform its employees of these dangers, “it was foreseeable that Ms. 
Satterfield would come into close contact with Mr. Satterfield’s work clothes 
on an extended and repeated basis.”53 After determining that the risk of Ms. 
Satterfield being exposed to asbestos fibers was foreseeable, the court shifted 
its analysis to a balancing of the other factors.54  
The potential harm to Ms. Satterfield was great because of the risk of fatal 
illnesses caused by exposure to asbestos.55 As for importance or social value 
of the activity engaged in by the defendant and usefulness of the conduct to 
the defendant, the court noted the social value of job creation and 
manufacturing useful products.56 However, no connection between the 
allegedly negligent acts and Alcoa’s ability to provide employment or 
manufacture useful products was found.57 There was no demonstration that 
“the sort of exposure to asbestos that is involved in this case is a largely 
                                                                                                                                      
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 367. The court also considered that “Alcoa allegedly (1) failed to inform its 
employees that they were working with materials containing asbestos; (2) failed to provide its 
employees with or to require them to wear protective covering on their clothes; (3) actively 
discouraged its employees’ use of on-site bathhouse facilities for changing or cleaning.” Id.  
 54. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 367. 
 55. Id. at 368. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. 
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unavoidable part of its manufacturing operations.”58 Considering whether 
alternative conduct was feasible, the court found that Alcoa could have 
greatly reduced the risk of asbestos exposure without undue burden.59 The 
court stated that “Alcoa had a duty to use reasonable care to prevent 
exposure to asbestos fibers not only to its employees, but also to those who 
came into close regular contact with its employees’ contaminated work 
clothes over an extended period of time.60 
Finally, the Satterfield court addressed the argument that Ms. Satterfield 
fell outside the “proper scope of the class of persons to whom a duty is owed 
in cases of this sort.”61 Alcoa argued that recognizing Ms. Satterfield’s claim 
would greatly expand the scope of employers’ duty, explaining as follows:  
[N]o principled basis exists to limit the duty to the members of 
the employee’s immediate family living in the employee’s house 
and thus that recognizing a duty to these family members will 
eventually result in the recognition of a duty with regard to 
babysitters, housekeepers, home repair contractors, and next-
door neighbors.62  
While acknowledging the validity of Alcoa’s concerns,63 the court held 
that “[p]ublic policy does not warrant finding that there is no duty owed to 
such persons.”64 Satterfield recognized the existence of a duty, relying upon 
the notion that the defendant had created a risk.65 The court limited the 
class of persons to whom a duty is owed to “persons who came into close 
and regular contact over an extended period of time with its employees’ 
work clothes.”66 Satterfield found this “fair and proportional duty” to be 
                                                                                                                                      
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. The risk of asbestos exposure  
[C]ould have been greatly reduced had Alcoa (1) provided basic warnings to its 
employees about the dangers of asbestos, (2) required safer handling of the 
materials containing asbestos, (3) provided coveralls to its employees, (4) 
required employees to change their clothes before leaving the workplace, (5) 
laundered its employees’ work clothes on site, or (6) encouraged its employees 
to use the on-site bathhouse facilities before leaving work. 
 Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 368. 
 60. Id. at 369. 
 61. Id. at 373. 
 62. Id. at 374. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 374. 
 65. Id. at 375.  
 66. See id.  
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“neither limitless nor impractical.”67 Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court held that the trial court erred by awarding Alcoa judgment on the 
pleadings; it affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the trial court and 
remanded the case back to the trial court.  
B. Approaches Taken by Other State Courts 
Like the Tennessee Supreme Court, other state supreme courts heavily 
emphasized foreseeability, while others rejected the use of foreseeability in 
determining the existence of a duty altogether. However, each of the other 
courts differ from Satterfield to some degree regarding the importance it 
attaches to foreseeability in determining the existence and scope of one’s 
duty to prevent take-home asbestos exposure to third parties.  
1. Foreseeability Focus  
Many courts emphasize the importance of foreseeability in analyzing 
duty for take-home asbestos exposure cases.68 In Rochon v. Saberhagen 
Holdings, Inc., the plaintiff’s husband was exposed to asbestos during his 
employment, and he brought those asbestos fibers into their home on his 
clothing.69 The plaintiff alleged that she inhaled those fibers while 
laundering her husband’s clothing and as a result eventually developed 
mesothelioma.70  
Similar to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Washington Court of 
Appeals in Rochon noted that “[w]hether an affirmative duty to act exists 
depends upon many factors, including ‘mixed considerations of logic, 
common sense, justice, policy, and precedent.’”71 The Rochon court, like 
Satterfield, considered foreseeability to be “part of the duty inquiry.”72 In 
Rochon, the court explained that “[t]he most common and obvious [way for 
a legal duty to arise] is when a party takes an affirmative action that results 
in an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”73 The court noted that an act is 
                                                                                                                                      
 67. Id. at 375. 
 68. See generally Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 965 N.E.2d 1092, 1098 (Ill. 2012) 
(referring to foreseeability as a “necessary factor to finding a duty”); Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d 
at 366 (noting foreseeability’s “paramount importance”); Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, 
Inc., No. 58579-7-I, 2007 WL 2325214 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007) (remanding for 
discovery on foreseeability). 
 69. Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *1. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. (determining “[w]hether harm is foreseeable is part of the duty inquiry”). 
 73. Id. at *2. 
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only “‘unreasonable’ . . . if a reasonable person would have foreseen the 
risk.”74 If this reasoning is to be followed, foreseeability is necessarily 
relevant to the determination of whether a duty exists.  
The Rochon court further analyzed whether, under the facts of the case, 
the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff.75 Its conclusion resembled the 
Satterfield court’s in that it was the defendant’s “own affirmative acts—
operating its own factory in an unsafe manner—that allegedly caused [the 
plaintiff’s] illness, not either a failure to act or the act of a third party.”76 The 
court rejected an argument from the defendant that “extending a duty to 
[the plaintiff] will expose employers to endless litigation.”77 Much like 
Satterfield, the Rochon court disagreed with this argument,78 citing limiting 
factors such as the requirement for causation;79 that the duty arises only 
regarding damage caused by the defendant’s own affirmative acts;80 and the 
role courts and juries can play in limiting duty81 as reasons for 
disagreement. However, unlike the Satterfield court,82 Rochon did not 
consider other factors that limit the scope of one’s duty.  
2. Legal Relationship Focus  
In Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., the Delaware Supreme Court 
focused its duty analysis on whether the conduct complained of was 
misfeasance or nonfeasance.83 In Price, the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos 
fibers while living with her husband from 1957 to 1991.84 Her husband, who 
worked for DuPont, was exposed to the fibers at work, which caused the 
plaintiff to be repeatedly exposed to the fibers at home.85 The plaintiff 
alleged that “DuPont knew or should have known that the asbestos fibers 
                                                                                                                                      
 74. Id.  
 75. See Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *2-3. 
 76. Id. at *3. 
 77. Id. at *4. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at *5 (stating that a “general duty to act reasonably . . . will only extend to a 
victim if the victim proves that his or her injury was a foreseeable consequence of its actions”) 
(emphasis added). 
 80. See id. at 4. (“[T]he duty is only one to act reasonably to prevent injury from 
[defendant’s] own risky acts, not to protect [plaintiff] from acts of third parties or from 
circumstances it did not create.”). 
 81. See Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *4. 
 82. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 365 (Tenn. 2008). 
 83. Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 167-68 (Del. 2011). 
 84. Id. at 164. 
 85. Id.  
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would be transported.”86 The court determined that the conduct constituted 
nonfeasance.87 Because the conduct constituted nonfeasance, the court 
required the plaintiff to allege that a “‘special relationship’ existed between 
her and [the defendant] in order for [the defendant] to owe her a duty of 
care.”88 The court held that the plaintiff had not established any special 
relationship, and that accordingly, the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a 
duty.89  
3. Factor Balancing Approach  
In CSX Transp. Inc. v. Williams, four plaintiffs brought suit under 
Georgia negligence law, claiming that “clothing exposure” contributed to 
their asbestos-related disease.90 The Georgia Supreme Court framed the 
issue as whether an employer owed a duty to third-party, non-employees 
who encounter asbestos-tainted work clothing at locations away from the 
workplace.91 The court first considered whether CSXT owed a duty as an 
employer to a third-party. Although “[u]nder Georgia statutory and 
common law, an employer owes a duty to his employee to furnish a 
reasonably safe place to work and to exercise ordinary care and diligence to 
keep it safe,”92 the plaintiffs were not employees of CSXT. Therefore, CSXT 
owed no specific duty to the plaintiffs.93 Next, the court discussed “duties 
beyond the scope of an employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace.”94 In 
doing so, the court considered a combination of three factors: (1) whether 
there was an employer-employee relationship;95 (2) whether there was 
misfeasance;96 and (3) whether the exposure occurred at the workplace.97 
                                                                                                                                      
 86. Id. at 165. 
 87. Id. at 168.  
 88. Id. at 169. 
 89. Price, 26 A.3d at 169-70. 
 90. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 2005). 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 209. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 210.  
 95. See id. (“The court in that case held the common law duty to provide employees 
with a safe workplace ‘has not been extended to encompass individuals . . . who are neither 
“employees” nor “employed” at the worksite.’”). 
 96. See Williams, 608 S.E.2d at 210 (“[W]here one by his own act . . . creates a dangerous 
situation, he is under a duty to remove the hazard or give warning of the danger . . . . 
However, these cases do not involve CSXT itself spreading asbestos dust among the general 
population, thereby creating a dangerous situation . . . .”). 
 97. See id.  
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Relying on these factors, the Georgia Supreme Court held that “Georgia 
negligence law does not impose any duty on an employer to a third-party, 
non-employee, who comes into contact with its employee’s asbestos-tainted 
work clothing at locations away from the workplace.”98 
4. Limiting Widespread Liability  
In the case of In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., the Court of Appeals of New 
York considered whether the defendant, the New York City Port Authority 
(“NYCPA”), owed a duty to plaintiff-wife, who was injured by at-home 
exposure to asbestos dust that plaintiff-husband brought home on his work 
clothes.99 The court listed several factors that courts traditionally balance to 
make duty determinations,100 but ultimately sought to limit the potential 
expansion of liability.101 In its analysis, the court rejected the notion that 
foreseeability defines duty.102 The court, instead, considered foreseeability to 
be a factor that determines the scope of one’s duty, but only after it has been 
determined that a duty exists.103  
The court then considered the plaintiff’s arguments that the NYCPA 
owed a duty by virtue of its status as an employer.104 Considering precedent 
from multiple jurisdictions, including CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams,105 the 
court held that an employer only owes a duty to provide a “safe workplace” 
to its employees.106 The court then addressed the plaintiff’s alternative claim 
that the NYCPA owed a duty of care due to its status as a landowner. The 
court noted that “[a] landowner generally must ‘exercise reasonable care, 
with regard to any activities which he carries on, for the protection of those 
                                                                                                                                      
 98. Id. at 210. 
 99. In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 116 (N.Y. 2005). 
 100. Id. at 119 (“Courts traditionally fix the duty point by balancing factors, including the 
reasonable expectations of parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims, the 
likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like liability, disproportionate risk and reparation 
allocation, and public policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new channels of 
liability.”). 
 101. See id. (“Thus, in determining whether a duty exists, courts must be mindful of the 
precedential, and consequential, future effects of their rulings, and limit the legal 
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree;” and discussing “the specter of limitless 
liability” as well as “judicial resistance to expansion of duty.”). 
 102. Id. (“Foreseeability, alone, does not define duty . . . .”). 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 120-22. 
 105. In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d at 121. 
 106. Id. at 120-21. 
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outside of his premises.’”107 However, the court suggested that the plaintiffs 
were, “in effect, asking us to upset our long-settled common-law notions of 
an employer’s and landowner’s duties.”108 The court balked at the idea of 
the defendant owing the plaintiff-wife a duty, instead it suggested that a 
finding of duty in this case would create limitless liability.109 
5. Judicial Reliance on State Legislature 
In Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the wife of an employee working 
with asbestos-containing materials sued Goodyear when she was diagnosed 
with malignant mesothelioma years after her husband had stopped working 
for the company.110 The defendant moved for summary judgment, relying 
on an Ohio statute.111 The statute provided that premises owners are “not 
liable for any injury to any individual resulting from asbestos exposure 
unless that individual’s alleged exposure occurred while the individual was 
at the premises owner’s property.”112 The trial court entered summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant,113 the appellate court affirmed,114 and 
the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.115 Rather than engaging in complicated 
balancing tests and “implicat[ing] [the] core principles of [state] tort law,”116 
the Ohio Supreme Court adjudicated by applying Ohio’s statutory scheme. 
In effect, the state legislature took the balancing of social policy out of the 
judicial branch’s hands. Accordingly, the court was able to rely on canons of 
statutory construction to adjudicate rather than judicial balancing.117 
                                                                                                                                      
 107. Id. at 121 (citing W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 57, at 387 (5th ed. 
1984)). 
 108. Id. at 122. 
 109. See id. (“This line is not so easy to draw, however. . . . [T]he ‘specter of limitless 
liability’ is banished only when ‘the class of potential plaintiffs to whom the duty is owed is 
circumscribed by the relationship’”); see also id. (“[W]e must consider the likely 
consequences of adopting the expanded duty urged by plaintiffs.”). 
 110. Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 449-50 (Ohio 2010).  
 111. Id. at 450. 
 112. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941(A)(1) (West). 
 113. Boley, 929 N.E.2d at 450. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 453. 
 116. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 354 (Tenn. 2008). 
 117. See generally Boley, 929 N.E.2d at 452. (choosing a construction that “[gave] such 
interpretation as will give effect to every word and clause in it . . . the legislative intent behind 
R.C. 2307.941(A) is apparent”). 
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C. Secondary Source Approaches 
Secondary sources have differing views on the take-home exposure cases. 
While some have taken the view that take-home exposure cases have no 
merit,118 others have created balancing tests.119 
1. The Unwarranted Basis for Today’s Asbestos “Take-Home” Cases 
One solution proposed by secondary sources is that courts should take 
an approach similar to In re N.Y.C. Asbestos,120 which seeks to limit liability 
in take-home cases. In The Unwarranted Basis for Today’s Asbestos “Take-
Home” Cases, the author’s argument emphasizes causation and the 
probability that take-home asbestos exposure results in mesothelioma.121 
Finding the probability of developing mesothelioma to be low,122 the author 
attacked the credibility of testifying plaintiffs’ experts that suggest low levels 
of take-home exposure can cause mesothelioma.123 Instead, the author 
suggested that spontaneous disease is the real cause for most mesothelioma 
diagnoses.124 
Under the author’s view, plaintiffs proceed beyond summary judgment 
too easily because experts routinely testify that “any exposure” can lead to 
the development of mesothelioma.125 To solve this problem, the author 
proposed multiple solutions. First, considering the experts’ any exposure 
theories, the author suggested that courts should limit the duty owed by 
employers by including “an outright restriction on duty beyond the 
immediate workplace.”126 Second, the author suggested that courts should 
                                                                                                                                      
 118. William L. Anderson, The Unwarranted Basis for Today’s Asbestos “Take-Home” 
Cases, 39 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 107, 129 (2015). 
 119. Meghan E. Flinn, A Continuing War with Asbestos: The Stalemate Among State 
Courts on Liability for Take-Home Asbestos Exposure, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 746 
(2014). 
 120. See supra Section I.B.4. 
 121. Anderson, supra note 118, at 114-15 (considering what the graph would have looked 
like had “even the most minimal level of ‘take-home’ asbestos fibers cause[d] spousal 
mesothelioma”). 
 122. Id. at 115 (“Thus, the actual incidence of mesothelioma illustrates exactly how hard 
it is to develop mesothelioma from take-home exposures. The dose received really does 
matter.”). 
 123. Id. (“Given this data, it is virtually certain that low levels of take-home, clothes-
washing exposures do not cause mesothelioma, and plaintiff experts are incorrect when they 
so testify.”).  
 124. Id. at 116. 
 125. See id. at 122-24. 
 126. Id. at 127. 
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consistently reject the any exposure theory and require plaintiffs to “prove a 
causative dose consistent with epidemiology studies showing disease in 
exposed populations.”127 
2. Multi-Factored Judicial Test Solution 
Another proposed solution includes a multi-factored test. Continuing 
War with Asbestos: The Stalemate Among State Courts on Liability for Take-
Home Asbestos Exposure noted that while “courts commonly hold four 
specific factors as important in duty analysis: the foreseeability of harm, the 
relationship between the parties, the burden that creating a duty will place 
on the defendant, and public policy considerations . . . [n]one of these 
factors alone suffices to establish a duty.”128 Accordingly, the author creates 
a test that combines the four factors, creating a flexible test that allows state 
courts to apply their own state law while respecting the policy 
considerations of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.129 Finally, the article 
proposes that despite the flexibility of the judicial test, a legislative action 
could solve the take-home exposure problem much more effectively than 
the courts.130 
II.  FOCUSING ON FORESEEABILITY IN A MULTI-FACTORED BALANCING TEST 
BEST ADJUDICATES DUTY’S ROLE IN COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS. 
The ideal test for adjudicating duty is a multifactor test that focuses on 
foreseeability as a threshold determination. Under this paradigm, 
foreseeability would be treated as an essential element necessary to prove 
the existence of a duty owed by the employer to the third-party plaintiff. 
Only after foreseeability is established should the court continue its analysis 
with other factors such as the existence of a legal relationship, the burden of 
preventing the harm, the possible magnitude of the potential harm or 
injury, the feasibility of alternative conduct, and the relative safety of that 
alternative conduct.  
Upon a finding of foreseeable injury, these other factors serve as a way 
for courts to determine the scope of this duty. They are only relevant if the 
court finds that the injury was foreseeable. Absent a finding of foreseeable 
                                                                                                                                      
 127. Anderson, supra note 118, at 127-28. 
 128. Flinn, supra note 119, at 746. 
 129. See id. at 751 (“Allowing for flexibility within the structure of a four-prong test 
ensures that a state can conform to its negligence jurisprudence while bringing an element of 
uniformity to duty analysis nationwide.”). 
 130. See id. at 751-56.  
2017] DUTY IN TAKE-HOME ASBESTOS EXPOSURE CASES 215 
 
harm, other factors need not be considered because there is no duty without 
foreseeability.  
Under this test, “to prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show 
that the risk was foreseeable, but that showing is not, in and of itself, 
sufficient to create a duty. Instead, if [the court finds the risk foreseeable, it 
will] then undertake the balancing analysis.”131 Much like Satterfield’s test, 
this multi-step analysis may involve a balancing of several factors, but, 
unlike Satterfield, this test will not distinguish between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance. Although there is a distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance,132 this distinction has been given too much power in other 
tests. Furthermore, this test expressly rejects “no duty” findings for the 
purpose of avoiding “the specter of limitless liability.” This is not to say that 
public policy may not limit one’s duty, but rather that a court seeking to 
limit duty on public policy grounds must refer to some specific public 
interest or policy that would be furthered by finding no duty.  
A. Foreseeability First: Why Foreseeability Is Essential and Why 
Foreseeability Must be Considered First 
There are many policies that can be considered when determining 
whether a duty exists,133 but above all, foreseeability should be treated as a 
necessary element of duty. However, foreseeability alone is insufficient to 
create a duty.134 Rather, foreseeability should be considered first as a 
threshold issue.  
1. Foreseeability is a practical first step in analysis because it limits 
frivolous claims. 
Examining foreseeability first can help courts limit the number of 
frivolous claims in asbestos litigation. “The United States Supreme Court 
has noted [that there is an] ‘elephantine mass of asbestos cases.’”135 Most 
                                                                                                                                      
 131. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 366 (Tenn. 2008). 
 132. In cases of misfeasance, “the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the 
plaintiff,” but in cases of nonfeasance, “he has at least made his situation no worse, and has 
merely failed to benefit him by interfering in his affairs.” Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 356. 
 133. See generally Chaisson v. Avondale Indus. 947 So. 2d 171, 182 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 134. Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 206 Cal. App. 4th 15, 31 (2012), as modified on denial 
of reh’g (June 19, 2012) (quoting Erlich v. Menezes, 21 Cal. 4th 543, 552 (1999)) 
(“[F]oreseeability alone is not sufficient to create an independent tort duty.”); Miller v. Ford 
Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 
206, 212 (Mich. 2007) (“[T]hat the harm was foreseeable is also not dispositive.”). 
 135. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 369 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999)).  
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asbestos claims result “from attorney-sponsored mass screenings and 
involve plaintiffs with little or no asbestos-related impairment.”136 With so 
many claims, some of them frivolous, it is important that courts find a way 
to efficiently adjudicate these cases without unjustly excluding meritorious 
claims. By treating foreseeability as the threshold element of duty analysis, 
courts can “quickly eliminate factually deficient cases at summary 
judgment.”137 If faced with a case where the harm was not foreseeable, “a 
court could rule in favor of the defendant on the issue of duty without 
resorting to a jury.”138 This approach allows courts to categorically remove 
cases in which the harm was not foreseeable, without dismissing valid 
claims unnecessarily. A claim dismissed for lack of foreseeability is 
dismissed for good cause.139 Likewise, a case featuring foreseeable injury 
deserves further analysis on the duty issue.  
Although not universally accepted,140 the idea of addressing foreseeability 
first is shared among many jurisdictions, even those that give substantial 
weight to other factors. For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan, 
despite its reliance on the relationship of the parties, noted that “[w]hen the 
harm is not foreseeable, no duty can be imposed on the defendant. But 
when the harm is foreseeable, a duty still does not necessarily exist.”141 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Illinois understands foreseeability to be 
essential to duty determinations. “Though foreseeability is not the only 
factor we consider, it is a necessary factor to finding a duty. If the injury was 
not reasonably foreseeable, no duty can exist.”142 By giving foreseeability 
such heavy emphasis and by utilizing foreseeability as a necessary starting 
point, this test reflects the common value shared by multiple state courts 
and the Restatement (Third) of Torts.143  
                                                                                                                                      
 136. Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: The Tide Appears 
to Be Turning, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 477, 477 (2006).  
 137. Flinn, supra note 119, at 747. 
 138. Id. at 748.  
 139. See Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 965 N.E.2d 1092, 1098 (Ill. 2012)  (“Though 
foreseeability is not the only factor we consider, it is a necessary factor to finding a duty. If 
the injury was not reasonably foreseeable, no duty can exist.”). 
 140. See generally In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 119 (N.Y. 2005) 
(explaining that foreseeability is only used after duty is determined).  
 141. Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of 
Tex.), 740 N.W. 2d 206, 212 (Mich. 2007).  
 142. Simpkins, 965 N.E.2d at 1098.  
 143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2010) (“Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct 
lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in 
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2. Examining foreseeability first does not create unlimited liability. 
Some defendants argue that companies will be exposed to enormous 
financial burden if exposed to liability for illnesses caused by exposure to 
asbestos fibers in the manufacturing process.144 This argument is 
unpersuasive for three reasons.145 First, from a logical perspective, a 
principle of law that emphasizes foreseeability does not create a new and 
endless stream of plaintiffs via stare decisis; it merely focuses on 
particularized circumstances in a particular case. Though two separate cases 
may both involve foreseeable harm, these two cases may have factual 
differences. These factual differences may include the availability of 
alternative conduct to a given defendant, or perhaps the social utility the 
defendant’s conduct. Second, the structure of the negligence cause of action, 
as well as the test for which this Note advocates, requires plaintiffs to prove 
much more than mere foreseeability. Simply emphasizing foreseeability 
does not cause widespread liability.146 Third, because of the structural 
safeguards inherent in the negligence cause of action, any potential 
expansion of liability arising out of an emphasis on foreseeability is not 
unjust.147 
A court does not broaden liability by emphasizing foreseeability, nor 
does a court broaden liability by considering foreseeability first. Consider 
Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.; there, the court suggested that “public policy 
concerns about the fairness and proportionality of [a duty arising out of 
foreseeable risk] should dissipate”148 because “[t]he duty . . . recognize[d] in 
these circumstances is focused on the particularized foreseeability of harm 
to plaintiff’s wife.”149  
The Olivo court is not alone in making this assertion.150 In fact, the idea 
that finding a duty to third parties in take-home exposure cases would 
create limitless liability “seriously overstates what the consequences of 
                                                                                                                                      
harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”). 
 144. See Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 371 (Tenn. 2008) 
(Defendant suggests that “manufacturers who use materials containing asbestos in their 
manufacturing process will face enormous financial burdens if they are exposed to liability 
for illnesses caused by exposure to asbestos fibers in their manufacturing processes.”). 
 145. Id. (“We find this argument unpersuasive.”). 
 146. See Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 375; Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579–
7–I, 2007 WL 2325214 at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
 147. See Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214, at *4. 
 148. Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1150 (N.J. 2006). 
 149. Id.  
 150. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 375; Rochon, WL 2325214, at *4. 
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imposing a burden on defendant would truly be.”151 “[The question of duty 
in each case] asks whether this defendant should be found to have a duty 
owed to [plaintiff]. Thus, the potential burden must be examined in this 
limited context, not extrapolated to all other imaginable potential 
litigants.”152 As the Chaisson court stated, “limitless liability would not be 
created in this case if we found a duty under these particular facts and 
circumstances.”153 
Because each case is decided upon particular facts and circumstances 
presented by the parties, it logically follows that any expansion of liability 
would only expand liability to those cases that have similar facts and 
circumstances.154 Courts arriving at similar results after applying a set of 
factors to similar facts are not expanding liability, they are merely 
upholding stare decisis.155 Thus, an argument that suggests the defendant 
owed no duty in order to prevent limitless liability rests on one of two 
premises: either the argument incorrectly suggests that stare decisis would 
result in liability in dissimilar cases; or that it would be financially unfair to 
hold a particular defendant liable. The first of these premises is inconsistent 
                                                                                                                                      
 151. Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of 
Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206, 225 (Mich. 2007) (Cavanagh, J. dissenting). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., 947 So. 2d 171, 182 (La. Ct. App. 2006).  
 154. There are factual scenarios that could easily be outcome determinative on many 
different factors. For example, a plaintiff’s contact with the asbestos may not be regular, 
repeated, or over a sufficient period such that his injury was foreseeable. See Satterfield, 266 
S.W.3d. at 374 (“[T]he duty we recognize today extends to those who regularly and 
repeatedly come into close contact with an employee’s contaminated work clothes over an 
extended period of time . . . .”). It is also possible that a plaintiff’s injury is completely 
foreseeable, and yet preventing the injury would have been too great a burden on the 
defendant. See id. at 368 (considering whether defendant articulated a connection between 
its allegedly negligent acts and its ability to provide employment or produce useful products, 
as well as whether defendant took reasonable steps to prevent exposure such as requiring 
employees to change clothes before leaving the workplace, laundering work clothes on site, 
or encouraging employees to shower before leaving work). 
 155. Upholding stare decisis has value:  
It would therefore be extremely inconvenient to the public if precedents were 
not duly regarded, and pretty implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and 
stability of such rules, that professional men can give safe advice to those who 
consult them; and people in general can venture with confidence to buy, and to 
trust, and to deal with each other.  
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 443 (1826). 
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with the definition of stare decisis,156 and the second appears to be a 
desperate argument of last resort from a defendant who cannot win on the 
substance of tort law. Neither premise seems sufficiently strong to warrant 
courts softening the significance of foreseeability in name of limited 
liability.157  
Courts can apply multiple factors,158 but this is not the only structural 
safeguard that prevents mere foreseeability from turning into liability. The 
structure of the common law negligence claim prevents emphasizing 
foreseeability from unnecessarily broadening liability. Plaintiffs must still 
prove more than foreseeable harm in a common law negligence claim.159 
“For a valid take-home exposure claim, a plaintiff also has to demonstrate 
that the harm is attributable to the risks that the defendant itself created.”160 
Common law negligence requires that a plaintiff establish: “(1) a duty of 
care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct by the defendant 
falling below the standard of care amounting to a breach of that duty; (3) an 
injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate or legal cause.”161 
Under these requirements, merely finding that a duty exists and that injury 
occurred does not expose a defendant to liability. Plaintiffs must still prove 
that the defendant breached the duty of care and that defendant’s breach 
caused plaintiff’s injury.  
                                                                                                                                      
 156. “The doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial 
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 157. To suggest that either of these premises are “articulated countervailing principle[s] 
or polic[ies]” as required by RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) seems disingenuous.  
 158. See generally Chaisson, 947 So. 2d at 182; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“In exceptional cases, when an 
articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a 
particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the 
ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 291-93 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (applying several different factors to the evaluation of 
an actor’s conduct). 
 159. See Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 371 (“We find this argument unpersuasive.”); see 
generally Rebecca Leah Levine, Clearing the Air: Ordinary Negligence in Take-Home Asbestos 
Exposure Litigation, 86 WASH. L. REV. 359, 391 (2011) (discussing the things a plaintiff must 
demonstrate in addition to “the harm [being] a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s 
actions”). 
 160. Rebecca Leah Levine, Clearing the Air: Ordinary Negligence in Take-Home Asbestos 
Exposure Litigation, 86 WASH. L. REV. 359, 391 (2011). 
 161. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 355. 
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Thus, any defendant held to be liable under this test, will have been 
found to have a duty only after a balancing of multiple factors. 
Furthermore, the defendant must have breached this duty, and the breach 
must have caused harm to the plaintiff. In addition, any award of damages 
would be subject to any contributory negligence or comparative fault 
restrictions imposed by the various states. It seems incredulous to suggest 
that a court acts unreasonably by holding a defendant accountable after 
clearing each of these hurdles.  
While damages in these cases may be financially burdensome, “the 
financial burden of compensating these injuries . . . does not vanish into the 
ether”162 when the court finds that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty. 
Instead, the financial burden shifts from the asbestos user to an innocent 
bystander. This shift is inconsistent with the allocation of costs 
contemplated by tort law.163 “The overall policy of preventing future harm is 
ordinarily served, in tort law, by imposing the costs of negligent conduct 
upon those responsible.”164 If any party can prevent physical injury, it is the 
party that was able to look ahead and foresee the potential harm to the 
plaintiff.165  
Under the foreseeability first test, no defendant can be found in breach of 
his duty to another unless the defendant foresaw or should have foreseen 
the danger to others, disregarded this danger, and acted irresponsibly. Any 
such finding is not an unreasonable broadening of liability, but rather a 
showing of equal justice under law.  
B. Public Policy Favors Accountability in Asbestos Litigation. 
To the extent that public policy governs the scope of one’s duty, public 
policy favors holding employers accountable for take-home asbestos 
exposures. While it is true that courts are not precluded from relying on 
policy to limit one’s duty,166 courts must rely upon and specify some 
                                                                                                                                      
 162. Id. at 371 (“We find this argument unpersuasive.”). 
 163. See generally Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 297 (Cal. 2016) (“[T]he tort 
system contemplates that the cost of an injury, instead of amounting to a ‘needless’ and 
‘overwhelming misfortune to the prson injured,’ will instead ‘be insured by the [defendant] 
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.’”). 
 164. Id. at 295.  
 165. See id. at 297 (“[A]llocation of costs [to the defendant] ensure[s] that those ‘best 
situated’ to prevent such injuries are incentivized to do so.”). 
 166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(b) 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“[W]hen an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants 
denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the 
defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.”). 
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substantive policy that is furthered by limiting the scope of one’s duty.167 
Though the Restatement (Third) of Torts does mention denying or limiting 
liability,168 it only supports such a decision if “an articulated countervailing 
principle or policy”169 so warrants.170 These policies may include the social 
utility of the defendant’s conduct, stated legislative policy, judicial 
efficiency, or any number of other desirable public policies.  
While considerations of a given policy may affect a decision on the 
existence or scope of one’s duty, the court should not create its own public 
policy for the sake of limiting liability. Liability limitation, on its own, is not 
a valid public policy for the courts to implement without legislative 
instruction.171 The court is not responsible for using public policy to enforce 
dollar limits on judgments. Instead, if public policy dictates that liability 
should be limited for employers, the legislature should play this role.172 It is 
clear that legislatures can effectively address this issue if it is their will.173 
Lastly, there is regulatory authority to suggest that the public policy actually 
favors holding employers liable for mishandling asbestos.174  
                                                                                                                                      
 167. See id.  
 168. See id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 
cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“A no-duty ruling represents a determination . . . that no 
liability should be imposed on actors in a category of cases. Such a ruling should be 
explained and justified based on articulated policies or principles that justify exempting these 
actors from liability or modifying the ordinary duty of reasonable care.”) (emphasis added).  
 171. See Norman Singer & Shamble Singer, SUTHERLAND STATUTES & STATUTORY 
CONSTR. §47:23 (7th ed. 2016)  
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, like all rules of construction, 
may apply . . . to help determine a legislature’s intent that is otherwise not clear. 
Expressio unius instructs that, where a statute designates a form of conduct, the 
manner of its performance and operation, and the persons and things to which 
it refers, courts should infer that all omissions were intentional exclusions. 
The rule of construction states that legislative omissions are presumed to be intentional. 
Thus, if there is no articulated legislative preference for limiting liability, the court should 
refrain from using limited liability as a rationale for finding that no duty exists.  
 172. See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941(A)(1) (West) (limiting the scope of 
duty in take-home asbestos cases). 
 173. See 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §47:23 (7th ed. 2016). 
 174. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(a)(1) (2012) (“This section applies to all 
occupational exposures to asbestos in all industries . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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1. Federal regulations require managing asbestos exposure. 
Regulatory authority clearly indicates that “there is a strong public policy 
limiting or forbidding the use of asbestos.”175 In 1971, the United States 
Department of Labor established The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”).176 OSHA regulations place employers on notice 
of expected safety practices in employment contexts.177  The OSHA 
regulations on asbestos usage in the workplace are expansive,178 and clearly 
indicate that the federal government considers asbestos to be a highly 
dangerous substance.179 “These rigorous measures reflect OSHA’s 
awareness that the deadly and communicable nature of asbestos fibers 
merits mandating an involved process to prevent the spread of asbestos 
fibers . . . .”180 “These requirements were instituted despite the financial and 
other costs to businesses of implementing them.”181 Rather than 
emphasizing the burden that liability might potentially impose on a 
defendant, “[t]he severely dangerous character of asbestos should factor 
much more heavily in the analysis of whether defendant had a duty to 
mitigate the risk involved.”182  
2. Limiting liability is not a policy consideration under the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts. 
Courts considering whether a defendant owed a duty in a take-home 
asbestos case should not seek to limit liability by making a “no-duty” rule as 
a matter of public policy. Though some courts have made no-duty 
rulings,183 these rulings seem to be inconsistent with other stated public 
                                                                                                                                      
 175. Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 297-98 (Cal. 2016).  
 176. OSHA, Timeline of OSHA’s 40 Year History. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.osha.gov/osha40/timeline.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2016) (“The Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration was established in 1971.”). 
 177. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(a)(1) (2012). 
 178. See generally id. (“This section applies to all occupational exposures to asbestos in all 
industries . . . .”). 
 179. See generally id. (requiring respiratory protection, danger signs, and other 
precautionary measures). 
 180. Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of 
Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206, 230 (Mich. 2007) (Cavanagh, J. Dissenting). 
 181. Id. at 232. 
 182. Id. at 233. 
 183. See Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 402 (Ct. App. 2012) (“In 
some cases, when the consequences of a negligent act must be limited to avoid an intolerable 
burden on society, ‘policy considerations may dictate a cause of action should not be 
sanctioned no matter how foreseeable the risk.’”) (citations omitted); id. (quoting O’Neill v. 
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policies. According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, “[a]n actor whose 
negligence is a factual cause of physical harm is subject to liability for any 
such harm within the scope of liability.”184 Although the Restatement 
considers the possibility that the court will find the ordinary duty of care 
inapplicable,185 that is the exception, not the rule. The general presumption 
is that an actor whose negligence causes physical harm is subject to 
liability.186  
One can reasonably infer that public policy incentivizes reasonable 
behavior that avoids physical harm to others.187 If a court did make a 
categorical no-duty rule, that court would be giving “employers carte 
blanche to expose workers to communicable toxic substances without 
taking any measure whatsoever to prevent those substances from harming 
others.”188 Such a ruling would run in stark contrast to the public policy 
instruction responsible for awarding damages for negligent conduct. By 
requiring defendants to pay damages for their negligent conduct, courts 
“ensure that those ‘best situated’ to prevent such injuries are incentivized to 
do so.”189 Given asbestos’s harmful effects, it is difficult to imagine any 
“countervailing state policy promoting the use of asbestos to outweigh our 
general presumption in favor of incentivizing reasonable preventative 
measures.”190  
Defendants in take-home asbestos cases argue that “the costs of paying 
compensation for injuries that a jury finds they have actually caused would 
                                                                                                                                      
Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 1007 (Cal. 2012)) (“[S}trong policy considerations counsel against 
imposing a duty of care on pump and valve manufacturers to prevent asbestos-related 
disease.”); see also Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 696 (Iowa 
2009) (concluding that a take-home asbestos case was an appropriate time to modify the 
duty to exercise reasonable care under RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010)); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litigation, 840 N.E.2d 
115, 119 (N.Y. 2005) (expressing concern over “the specter of limitless liability”). But cf. 
Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 299 (Cal. 2016). (“We disapprove Campbell v. Ford 
Motor Co. . . . .”). 
 184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2010). 
 185. Id. (stating that”unless the court determines that the ordinary duty of reasonable 
care is inapplicable”). 
 186. Id.  
 187. See generally id. 
 188. Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of 
Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206, 225 (Mich. 2007) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 189. Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 297 (Cal. 2016).  
 190. Id.  
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be so great that [courts] should find no duty to prevent those injuries.”191 
This argument is flawed because “shielding tortfeasors from the full 
magnitude of their liability for past wrongs is not a proper consideration in 
determining the existence of a duty.”192 The most relevant burden on 
defendants in duty analysis is not the defendant’s potential liability, but 
rather the “cost to the defendants of upholding, not violating, the duty of 
ordinary care.”193 When a court creates a no-duty rule, the court creates a 
categorical rule against liability for a particular class of cases.194 Potentially 
broad liability “[does] not clearly justify a categorical rule against liability 
for foreseeable take-home exposure.”195 Therefore, no-duty rules premised 
on prevention of expansive liability in take-home asbestos cases are 
inconsistent with the role duty plays in tort law.196 
The burden on defendants to prevent take-home asbestos exposure is rather 
insubstantial. “The measures to prevent take-home exposure essentially boil 
down to ensuring that workers shower and change clothes after encountering 
asbestos.”197 These “simple actions” can prevent take-home asbestos exposure 
altogether.198 To argue that defendants owe no duty in take-home asbestos 
cases because there is a potential for expansive liability “grossly overstat[es] the 
burden of imposing a duty. It [considers] not the gravity of the health risks or 
even . . . the relatively marginal costs of prevention.”199 
3. The legislature is the appropriate mechanism for limiting employer 
liability. 
Legislatures can, and many have, limited employers’ liability. Around the 
country, certain types of business entities enjoy limited liability.200 However, 
                                                                                                                                      
 191. Id. at 296.  
 192. Id.  
 193. Id.  
 194. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. a 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“No-duty rules are appropriate only when a court can promulgate 
relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.”).  
 195. Kesner, 384 P.3d at 298. 
 196. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (requiring some articulated principle for the limitation or 
modification of one’s duty). 
 197. Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of 
Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206, 233 (Mich. 2007) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id.  
 200. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985) (“Limited liability is a fundamental principle of corporate law.”). 
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these legislative allowances for limited liability typically protect 
shareholders, not the entities themselves.201 The legislative grant of limited 
liability202 and the business judgment rule203 are evidence that society values 
limited liability in the business setting. Despite this societal value, 
legislatures have left business entities decidedly “on the hook” for the harms 
they cause.204  
Further, the societal value of encouraging individuals to participate in 
business is seemingly irrelevant to a business entity’s desire for preventing 
expansive liability. Limited liability for persons involved in an entity serves 
to protect people, not businesses.205 This is further illustrated by the 
business judgment rule, which serves to protect the business decisions made 
by individual decision-makers rather than the corporate entity.206 Public 
policy clearly protects business people. However, limitation of liability in 
take-home asbestos cases does not protect individual people. Limiting 
liability in take-home asbestos exposure cases, as a matter of public policy, 
protects the business entity itself. While liability for take-home asbestos 
cases may indirectly impact the business people, the individuals themselves 
are not held accountable by reason of being in the business.  
Furthermore, the fact that legislatures have accounted for limited liability 
in other ways suggests that public policy does not favor limited liability in 
take-home asbestos cases. The legislature has the power to limit liability for 
asbestos exposure via statute.207 For instance, a legislature could draft a 
statute that limits liability by creating a particularized class of persons to 
whom a duty is owed208 or by putting a statutory cap on damages in a 
particular class of cases. 
                                                                                                                                      
 201. Id. at 89-90. 
 202. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1019 (2015). 
 203. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993), decision modified on 
reargument, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994) (“The business judgment rule . . . operates to preclude 
a court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation.”). 
 204. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1019 (2015). 
 205. See id. 
 206. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360 (stating that the business judgment rule protects the 
decisions of corporate directors).  
 207. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941(A)(I) (West 2004). 
 208. See id. 
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C. The Case Against Emphasizing Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinctions. 
 “[T]here runs through much of the law a distinction between action and 
inaction.”209 While it is true that there is generally no duty to rescue,210 
courts have a tendency to incorrectly conclude that all omissions constitute 
nonfeasance.211 Illustrative of this point, the Satterfield court described a 
hypothetical in which “a driver who fails to apply his or her brakes to avoid 
hitting a pedestrian walking in a crosswalk” is negligent because his or her 
“careless failure to apply the brakes . . . is negligent driving, not negligent 
failure to rescue.”212 This is true, even though failing to apply the brakes “is 
an omission.”213 Still, “[t]he fact . . . the actor realizes or should realize that 
action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of 
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.”214 This tendency to 
assume omissions are nonfeasance (as well as the relationship misfeasance 
and nonfeasance share with causation) makes application of the 
misfeasance-nonfeasance factor undesirable.  
Despite these problems, some courts heavily emphasized this 
misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction in take-home asbestos cases. In Price, 
the court focused on whether there was misfeasance or nonfeasance.215 
Having only considered this factor, the court placed an ultimatum on the 
plaintiff: prove misfeasance, or face the new burden of proving a special 
relationship.216 This approach is inconsistent with the presumption that a 
duty exists if an actor’s conduct has created a risk of harm.217 There are a 
                                                                                                                                      
 209. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 356 (Tenn. 2008) (citing 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 373 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 210. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical or 
emotional harm to another has no duty of care to the other unless a court determines that 
one of the affirmative duties provided . . . is applicable.”). 
 211. See generally Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162 (Del. 2011) 
(holding that there was nonfeasance). 
 212. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 357. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 357 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) 
(alteration in original)). 
 215. Price, 26 A.3d at 168 (“The legal issue here is whether [defendant] committed 
misfeasance affecting [plaintiff].”). 
 216. Id. at 169 (“Having alleged only nonfeasance, to recover against DuPont, Price must 
allege that a ‘special relationship’ existed . . . .”). 
 217. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable 
care . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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number of other factors or policy considerations that a court can make to 
help limit this liability, but placing this ultimatum on the plaintiff without 
even considering foreseeability is wholly inconsistent with the approach 
advocated by the Restatement (Third) of Torts.218 
Another relevant case on the matter is CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams.219 
Though the CSX Transp. court first considered an employer’s duty to 
provide a safe workplace for employees,220 the court also considered the 
distinction between action and inaction.221 The court incorrectly applied 
this factor. In its analysis, the court wrote “these cases do not involve CSXT 
itself spreading asbestos dust among the general population, thereby 
creating a dangerous situation in the world beyond the workplace.”222 While 
it may be true that the defendants themselves have not deliberately placed 
asbestos in people’s homes, there is no such requirement.223 In CSX Transp., 
the defendants operated their business with asbestos products, and they 
exposed their employees to the asbestos fibers each day. This conduct 
created a dangerous situation.224  
The omission to prevent harm may still be misfeasance.225 The actor’s 
entire course of conduct is what creates misfeasance or nonfeasance.226 In 
instances where the defendant’s conduct creates a risk of harm, the 
                                                                                                                                      
 218. See generally id. (The concern over whether the actor’s conduct creates a risk of 
harm suggests that foreseeability should be considered.). 
 219. Supra section I.B.1. 
 220. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 209 ( Ga. 2005). 
 221. Id. at 210.  
 222. Id. 
 223. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 357 (Tenn. 2008). 
[D]istinguishing between misfeasance and nonfeasance can best be 
accomplished, not by focusing on whether an individual’s “specific failure to 
exercise reasonable care is an error of commission or omission,” but rather by 
focusing on whether the individual’s entire course of conduct created a risk of 
harm. Thus, even though the specific negligent act may constitute an omission, 
the entirety of the conduct may still be misfeasance that created a risk of harm. 
Id. 
 224. See generally Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 171 (Del. 2011) 
(Berger, J., dissenting) (“[Defendant’s] affirmative act was the release of asbestos in the 
workplace.”). 
 225. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 357 (using a hypothetical describing a negligent driver to 
illustrate that omissions may constitute misfeasance if “the individual’s entire course of 
conduct created a risk of harm”). 
 226. Id.  
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defendant ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care.227 Once the 
conduct has created a risk of harm, liability hinges upon factual and 
proximate cause.228 Distinguishing between action and inaction seems to 
implicate causation more so than duty. To ask whether the plaintiff was 
injured by the defendant’s actions or the defendant’s inaction inherently 
asks: “What caused the plaintiff’s harm?” For this reason, and because 
courts tend to misinterpret the distinction between omissions and 
nonfeasance, this Note suggests that misfeasance and nonfeasance need not 
be considered in take-home asbestos exposure cases.  
In the context of the hypothetical discussed in the opening paragraph of 
Section I,229 the defendant’s course of conduct is invariably what caused the 
original asbestos exposure. The only way that hypothetical could resolve 
itself without defendant’s course of conduct creating a risk is if some other 
person was responsible for the initial asbestos exposure. Even if that were 
the case, then misfeasance and nonfeasance are still not necessary to resolve 
the case. In scenarios where the person causing the initial asbestos exposure 
is not a defendant, the case should be dismissed upon failing to prove the 
cause in fact requirement. 
D. Legislation allows for courts to decide the existence and scope of duty 
more efficiently.  
Take-home asbestos cases provide a unique fact pattern that leaves state 
courts in a conundrum. 230 On the one hand, courts are often fearful231 of 
                                                                                                                                      
 227. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2010) (subjecting defendants to liability for harms within the scope of liability). 
 229. See supra Section I (hypothetical describing scenario in which A is exposed to 
asbestos at work for Company B, and in turn exposes a family member, person C, to asbestos 
at home). 
 230. See Flinn, supra note 119, at 751-756. See generally Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010). 
 231. In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litigation, 840 N.E.2d 115, 119 (N.Y. 2005) (noting “the 
specter of limitless liability”); see also Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 
689, 696 (2009) (concluding that a take-home asbestos case was an appropriate time to 
modify the duty to exercise reasonable care under RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010)); Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 
141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 402 (2012) (“In some cases, when the consequences of a negligent act 
must be limited to avoid an intolerable burden on society, ‘policy considerations may dictate 
a cause of action should not be sanctioned no matter how foreseeable the risk.’”) (citations 
omitted); see also id. at 403 (quoting O’Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 1007 (2012)). 
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creating sweeping liability.232 On the other, plaintiffs are often facing fatal 
disease.233 To explain its decisions, state courts dive into deep analysis about 
the policies that govern their own duty precedent.234 The courts 
adjudicating these matters are often left to make policy decisions by 
balancing factors.235 These policy decisions put the court at risk of 
overstepping the boundaries of judicial power.236  
Although this Note advocates for a judicial test tailored to resolve take-
home asbestos exposure cases, that test is more a necessity than the ideal 
outcome. Ideally, each state legislature would create a statute that specifies 
the class of persons to whom employers owe a duty. Regardless of whether 
this class of persons were limited to employees, employees’ family members, 
all foreseeable plaintiffs, or some other variation, statutes can help end the 
uncertainty around take-home asbestos litigation. While courts may apply 
policy, considerations of policy are better handled by a legislature. If given 
statutory authority on the matter, courts no longer run the risk of 
                                                                                                                                      
(“[S]trong policy considerations counsel against imposing a duty of care on pump and valve 
manufacturers to prevent asbestos-related disease.”). 
 232. Although for reasons discussed in Section II.A.2, supra, this concern is not 
dispositive. 
 233. See ASBESTOS.COM, https://www.asbestos.com/mesothelioma/ (last visited Oct. 15, 
2016); see Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 351 (twenty-five-year-old woman who contracted 
mesothelioma); Boley, 929 N.E. 2d at 450 (plaintiff diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma).  
 234. See Chaisson v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 947 So. 2d 171, 181 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2006) 
(noting seven different factors for Louisiana duty analysis); Miller v. Ford Motor Co. (In re 
Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex.), 740 N.W.2d 206, 215 (Mich. 
2007) (comparing Louisiana’s heavy reliance on foreseeability to Michigan’s heavy reliance 
on the relationship between the parties); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 
347, 355 (Tenn. 2008) (“[T]his case implicates core principles of Tennessee’s tort law . . . .”). 
 235. See Chaisson, 947 So. 2d at 181(noting seven different factors for Louisiana duty 
analysis); Miller, 740 N.W.2d at 215 (comparing Louisiana’s heavy reliance on foreseeability 
to Michigan’s heavy reliance on the relationship between the parties); Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d 
at 354, 367 (noting that the case implicates the core of its tort law as well as listing eight 
factors it will consider). 
 236. See generally Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 367-68 (“When considering these factors, 
courts should take care not to invade the province of the jury. A court’s function is more 
limited than a jury’s.”); see also id. at 367 (listing factors that are representative of the will of 
the people, and therefore more appropriately considered in the legislature: “the importance 
or social value of the activity engaged in by the defendant . . . the usefulness of conduct to the 
defendant . . . .”) (emphasis added); Riedel v. ICI Americas Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 20 (Del. 2009) 
(“The Restatement (Third) of Torts creates duties in areas where we have previously found 
no common law duty and have deferred to the legislature to decide whether or not to create a 
duty.”) (emphasis added). 
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overstepping its boundaries. Instead, simple application of the statute would 
resolve the case.  
As discussed earlier,237 courts tend to worry about creating limitless 
liability. Such a concern is understandable, but not controlling.238 Not only 
can state legislatures declare the state’s policy on the extent of an employer’s 
duty in take-home asbestos cases,239 but state legislatures may also declare to 
what extent (if any) liability is to be limited. 
Legislative authority on the matter has already been effective in guiding 
at least one state court.240 Recognizing the “virtual explosion in asbestos 
litigation,”241 the Ohio legislature passed legislation governing “all tort 
actions for asbestos claims brought against a premises owner to recover 
damages or other relief for exposure to asbestos on the premises owner’s 
property.”242 The statute provides that “[a] premises owner is not liable for 
any injury to any individual resulting from asbestos exposure unless that 
individual’s alleged exposure occurred while the individual was at the 
premises owner’s property.”243 This type of legislation allows the state to 
more accurately reflect public policies valued by society in these decisions 
than any judicial balancing test. 
 Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.244 is a good example of the 
simplicity a statute would bring to take-home asbestos cases. In Boley, the 
plaintiff was exposed to asbestos dust at home while laundering her 
husband’s work clothes.245 The plaintiff was diagnosed with malignant 
mesothelioma,246 and filed suit against more than 200 defendants, including 
Goodyear.247 Rather than addressing a wide array of public policies in an in 
depth duty analysis, the court framed the issue as “whether R.C. 
2307.941(A) bars all tort liability against a premises owner for asbestos 
exposure originating from asbestos on the owner’s property if the exposure 
occurred away from the owner’s property or whether R.C. 2307941(A) is 
                                                                                                                                      
 237. See supra Section II.A.2.  
 238. Id. 
 239. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941(A) (West 2004). 
 240. See Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010). 
 241. Michael D. Kelly, Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 901 
(2011). 
 242. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941(A) (West 2004). 
 243. Id. at § 2307.941(A)(1).  
 244. Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448 (Ohio 2010). 
 245. Id. at 449.  
 246. Id. at 449-50. 
 247. Id. at 450. 
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inapplicable in such instances, thus permitting recovery against a premises 
owner.”248 By framing the issue in this way, the court avoided any sweeping 
statements of law that would unnecessarily impact other negligence cases. 
Rather, the court turned to principals of statutory construction to resolve a 
dispute as to the meaning of the statute.249 The court concluded that “a 
premises owner is not liable in tort for claims arising from asbestos 
exposure originating from asbestos on the owner’s property, unless the 
exposure occurred at the owner’s property.”250  
If each jurisdiction had statutory authority to rely upon for this issue, all 
jurisdictions could engage in this type of analysis to resolve these claims 
without resorting to an arbitrary weighing of factors. One benefit provided 
by these types of statutes is that the court can adjudicate without creating 
new law. In addition, the parties are much more likely to know ahead of 
time whether they have a claim, reducing the number of take-home 
exposure lawsuits. Reliance upon well-drafted statutes simultaneously 
achieves just results and increases judicial efficiency. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
As state courts across the country decide take-home asbestos exposure 
cases, the existence and scope of the defendant’s duty is best determined by 
first examining foreseeability. If treated as a threshold matter, foreseeability 
can serve as a useful vehicle for limiting what has become a massive number 
of cases, many of which are frivolous. If balanced by consideration of other 
mitigating factors, treating foreseeability as a threshold matter does not 
result in limitless liability, but instead applies common law negligence in a 
straight-forward manner. Under this paradigm, there can be no duty 
without foreseeability. However, foreseeability alone is insufficient for the 
court to find that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. Instead, the court 
must balance other factors such as the existence of a legal relationship, the 
burden of preventing the harm, the possible magnitude of the potential 
harm or injury, the feasibility of alternative conduct, and the relative safety 
of that alternative conduct. These factors are useful for determining the 
scope, if any, of a defendant’s purported duty. 
If other factors, such as the distinction between affirmative acts and 
omissions are considered in advance of foreseeability, it is easy for the law 
                                                                                                                                      
 248. Id. at 449. 
 249. See Boley, 929 N.E 2d at 451 (noting the emphasis on legislative intent, looking to 
the language of the statue, and the purpose of the statute, as well as the policy for application 
of a clear and unambiguous statute). 
 250. Id. at 453.  
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to be misapplied. Still, while judicial balancing tests allow for courts to 
consider the totality of the circumstances in duty analysis, these tests can be 
inefficient. Legislation that defines which classes of individuals, if any, are 
owed a duty of reasonable care by employers in take-home asbestos 
exposure allows courts to simply apply canons of statutory construction to 
resolve otherwise difficult cases. 
 
 
